A 'constitutional asymmetry' exists at the heart of contemporary EU socio-economic governance, privileging the economic at the expense of the social. Prevailing academic responses suggest, on the one hand, the need for radical constitutional reforms aimed at redressing this asymmetry and, on the other hand, piecemeal reforms reliant on current soft and non-binding modes of governance for the championing of social concerns. Offering a pragmatic middle way between these positions, we identify the potential within the extant constitutional settlement to pursue a rebalancing in favour of the social. In particular, we highlight the Commission's preexisting legal and rhetorical commitment to social rights, arguing that it might draw on the standards established by the Council of Europe's European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) and incorporate these into its economic governance mechanism, the European Semester. Such a step would usefully repoliticise socio-economic governance in the short-term and promote radical reform in the long term.
Introduction
The current status quo is one that, according to many critics of supranational economic governance, privileges further integration at the expense of democratic and social politics at supranational and national levels. It can be understood in terms of the pursuit of what Gill refers to as a 'new constitutionalist' initiative on the part of élite actors:
[Such] initiatives are designed to lessen short-run political pressures on the formulation of economic policy by implicitly redefining the boundaries of the 'economic' and the 'political'. Such boundaries police the limits of the possible in the making of economic policy. Legal or administrative enforcement is required, of course, since the power of normalizing discourse or ideology is not enough to ensure compliance with the orthodoxy (Gill, 1998) .
If Maastricht and the establishment of monetary union and its governance represented an important 'new constitutionalist initiative' then the early years of monetary union confirmed Gill's above claim that a neo-liberal 'normalizing discourse or ideology' would not be enough to ensure 'compliance with the orthodoxy' as evidenced, inter alia, in the persistent breaching of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) (Parker, 2008) . Indeed, for many of the élites pursuing this 'initiative' the key problem with the structures of economic governance -and a key factor in the spillover of the global financial crisis into a Eurozone crisis -was precisely the lack of effective 'legal or administrative enforcement', particularly of levels of national public debt. This was the prevailing diagnosis of those political forces that led the reform process: in particular, a group of structurally powerful 'creditor' member states led by Germany (Bulmer, 2014; Matthijs, 2016) and key European institutions such as European Central Bank (ECB) and European Commission (Crespy and Menz, 2015) -collectively, the 'Brussels-Frankfurt consensus' (Jones, 2013) .
Following from such a diagnosis, reforms to EU socio-economic governance introduced a range of new legal mechanisms and increased the executive powers of the EU (and especially the European Commission) to 'police the limits of the possible' in national economic policies. More concretely, this has meant the imposition of socially deleterious austerity policies, particularly in highly indebted member states with low rates of growth. Against this backdrop it has been suggested that we witness in the contemporary EU, variously an 'authoritarian' (Oberndorfer, 2015) or 'Hayekian' (Streeck, 2014) constitutionalism that undermines distinct varieties of welfare and capitalism and broadly accepted labour and social rights norms. In short, responses to the crisis have exacerbated a constitutional 'asymmetry' between the economic and the social in favour of the former (Scharpf, 2010) . More generally, the conditions that have legitimised capitalism in the modern state, in particular the social and democratic contract between citizen and sovereign (Bellamy, 2012) , have been undermined by neoliberal governance mechanisms.
ii The current threat to what remains of the so-called European social model and a European democratic 'input' legitimacy -in the form of parliamentary politics and inclusive governanceis stark from such a perspective. And there is scant evidence that the empowerment of executive actors to enforce austerity will produce the economic growth that might grant the EU 'output' legitimacy. Indeed, many heterodox and political economists convincingly argue that policies of austerity and 'internal devaluation' -primarily in the form of wage cutting -are self-defeating in terms of reviving the European economy (Stiglitz, 2014; Krugman, 2015 , Blyth, 2015 . Contrary to the Frankfurt-Brussels consensus focused on public debt and administering austerity -often couched in terms of 'common sense' analogies with the household -these critics highlight that simultaneously implementing public-sector austerity across states that primarily trade with each other cannot work as an effective stimulus. Indeed, such an approach has rendered the social consequences of the crisis worse than they might have otherwise been.
We should be under no illusion that ameliorating economic stagnation and a worsening EU legitimacy crisis will be straightforward because a complex array of factors exogenous and endogenous to the EU/Eurozone context are driving this ongoing economic and institutional crisis (on the broader context, see, for instance, Gamble, 2014 , Streeck, 2014 , Rosamond, 2016 and on the EU/Eurozone context, see, for instance, Parker and Tsarouhas, 2017; Ryner and Cafruny, 2017; Matthijis and Blyth, 2015) . However, such difficulties have not prevented attempts to envisage alternative European responses. Such responses have taken broadly two forms. On the one hand, radical reform proposals have championed moves towards either deeper integration or (at least partial) disintegration. Some have, for instance, promoted the uploading of a social democratic politics and (rebalanced) constitutional settlement to supranational level, which would include the (re)regulation of finance and the establishment of a so-called 'transfer union' approximating a social-democratic federal state (Habermas, 2001 (Habermas, , 2013 . Others have argued that the end of economic and monetary integration (the euro) and the restoration of national monetary autonomy at least needs to be contemplated. This would address the growing imbalances between surplus and deficit countries that the single currency has locked-in and provide greater space for a national social democratic politics (Streeck, 2014; Flassbeck and Lapavitsas, 2015) . Both extremes would represent radical overhauls of the prevailing constitutional settlement in the EU and in that sense both represent long-term visions.
However, when we consider the reality of integration and disintegration blockages -in terms of a lack of both popular and governmental support for both such proposals -we would argue that neither will be realisable in the short to medium term in the absence of a significant further crisis (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2013: 3-4) .
On the other hand, a number of pragmatic proposals have suggested ways in which we might rebalance a neoliberal orientation with social concerns within the EU's current contemporary socio-economic governance structures. Often such pragmatic perspectives identify current practices of soft governance or policy co-ordination in social and employment policy and suggest that they might be made more robust via piecemeal reform (Zeitlin, 2010; Zeitlin and Vanhercke, 2014) . While far more realisable than radical proposals, as discussed in what follows, we contend that many such proposals understate the ways in which conceptions of 'the social' have been rhetorically transformed -subsumed within a neoliberal agenda -in the contemporary EU and overstate what soft governance mechanisms might achieve in the broader context of a hardened neoliberal legal framework. In short, they fail to shift the aforementioned constitutional asymmetry in any meaningful way.
Reflecting on both sets of reform proposal we concur with Fritz Scharpf's insight that:
[W]e… do not have normatively and pragmatically convincing ideas of what could and should be done if the window of political opportunity for a basic overhaul of the system should open … [P]olitically feasible policies appear to be ineffective and illegitimate, whereas radical policy changes seem to lack political feasibility. In other words, our conclusions seem to resemble the advice the tourist received when asking an Irish farmer for the way to Tipperary: "If I were you, I wouldn't start from here" (2014: 14-15).
Scharpf himself proposes a series of reforms designed to fill the gap that he identifies. Cutting through the detail of his proposals, these are geared towards a rebalancing of the constitutional asymmetry and an opening of more space for differentiated integration, whereby states can more easily opt-out of integration in certain areas. His suggestions are oriented towards enlarging 'the action spaces of national and European political processes' (Scharpf, 2014: 18) ; essentially, the repoliticisation of a depoliticised socio-economic governance that would permit a shift away from the failures of a neoliberal austerity highlighted above. We concur with the broad orientation of these and similar proposals. However, whether they really start 'from here' is debatable; indeed, with Scharpf, we believe that for such reforms to be realisable a rather large 'window of political opportunity' would need to open.
In this paper we present a proposal that is closer to the pragmatic and technocratic reforms highlighted above -a proposal that 'starts from here' and might be realisable in the context of a far narrower window of political opportunity -but at once has the potential to address the EU's constitutional bias. Notwithstanding the reality of such a bias, we believe that unfulfilled potential remains within the extant European constitutional settlement to quite radically challenge a neo-liberal reality. We concur with Dawson and de Witte who note that, "[l]aw can be used -and has been used in the past in the integration process -precisely as a means of politicising societal choices." (Dawson and de Witte, 2013: 843; see also, Parker, 2008 Existing legal scholarship on rights has provided a comprehensive account of the ways in which fundamental rights have been used before constitutional and international courts to resist neoliberal reforms ex post (see Kilpatrick and De Witte, 2014) . Offering a different though complementary perspective, we highlight the potential for rights to act as an ex ante constitutional check within EU governance processes, considering the ways in which the Commission could and, indeed, should, engage with rights. The European Commission, as the key actor in contemporary socio-economic governance and a potentially powerful 'policy entrepreneur' (Crespy and Menz, 2015) could and should abandon its orthodox endorsement of austerity and build on pre-existing links with the Council of Europe in order to learn important lessons from this Committee. In particular, an assessment of the implications of economic policy for social rights should, according to the Commission's own commitments, be inserted into the structures through which EU and Eurozone governance currently takes place: namely, the European Semester.
The argument is built upon a careful analysis of EU primary documents relating to EU socioeconomic governance, the application of fundamental rights in the EU and the case-law of the ECSR. Insights from several interviews with officials in the European Commission have also been incorporated where appropriate. In a first step, we describe how economic governance reforms have hardened neoliberalism in the EU in recent years, increasing discretionary powers for executive actors, particularly the European Commission, within a technocratic mode of governance: the so-called European Semester. Second, we argue that while the social dimension of the EU has been largely subsumed within a neoliberal agenda, the Commission could, and should, use its significant margin for discretion to take seriously its commitment to the social rights contained in the ECFR. In the third and final step, we describe the mechanisms via which such rights could be incorporated into the European Semester process and significance of ECSR expertise in this context. In conclusion we are clear on the limitations of our proposal, which will rely upon as well as reinforce broader shifts away from a neo-liberal governing rationality.
Crisis and EU socio-economic governance
The permanent structure of EU socio-economic governance is embodied in the European Semester, which is the primary focus of this paper.
iii Introduced in 2011, the Semester refers to a rather complex (some would say convoluted) cyclical governance process characterised by regular annual reporting at supranational and national levels that is underpinned by a range of targets. It is concerned first (and foremost) with ensuring member state compliance with the fiscal targets enshrined in the revamped Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) (public deficits to be kept below 3 per cent and public debt below 60 per cent of GDP) and the 'fiscal compact' of the Treaty on Stability Coordination and Governance (TSCG) (structural deficit to be kept below 1 per cent GDP). Second, it is concerned with ensuring adherence to an array of targets measuring macroeconomic imbalances and economic competitiveness, including current account balance and unit labour costs, determined by the European Commission's Directorate-General for Any non-compliant Eurozone state that fails to address is breaching of fiscal rules (EDP) or 'excessive macroeconomic imbalances' (MIP) can be sanctioned. Unlike traditional EU policy, which relies on judicial enforcement by the ECJ, these mechanisms are enforced by the Commission, with member states only able to block these moves by qualified majority in the Council ('reverse qualified majority voting'). The financial sanctions themselves are significant, amounting to 0.2 per cent GDP under the EDP and 0.1 per cent of GDP under the MIP, as well as restrictions on access to EU structural funds.
iv Cutting through these technicalities of the Semester process, we can say that, in accordance with
Gill's abovementioned notion of a 'new constitutionalist' project, the current design reflects a hardening of the legal and administrative capacity of actors to enforce neoliberal preferences in the EU and the Eurozone in particular. Monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms have been reinforced (Bauer and Becker, 2014: 219-223; Oberndorfer, 2015) and states have been obliged to implement reforms that embed neoliberal preferences in national legislation. Moreover, this has both relied upon and permitted a significant expansion of executive discretionary power. We have witnessed a proclivity on the part of executive actors in the Council to usurp the role of the Commission in initiating legislation. At times they have enacted legislation with a dubious basis in the extant 'European constitution' (the treaty base). This latter approach was adopted for the tranche of legislation that was pushed through to establish the more long term policing mechanisms such as the MIP and EDP. As Oberndorfer puts it, not mincing his words, 'the ordinary revision procedure [the EU's standard legislative procedure] is being circumvented and/or the appropriate instruments are being pressed into the "European Constitution" illegally' (2015: 189) . This has led him to characterise the emerging status quo not as 'new' but 'authoritarian' constitutionalism.
If the Council has established the legal framework underpinning this new governance approach then it is, as noted, the Commission that is, in the context of the Semester, granted executive power and significant discretion to interpret laws and data, to pass judgement and impose sanctions. The Commission has arguably been complicit in its own empowerment as executive actor in recent reforms to socio-economic governance (Crespy and Menz, 2015) . Within the Commission power has shifted towards DG ECFIN (and some other economic DGs). A greater array of social and labour policy areas have been subsumed within macroeconomic coordination (as discussed further in the following section), wherein they are decided by DG ECFIN and the Economic and Finance Council (Copeland and James, 2014; Oberndorfer, 2015) . DG ECFIN has, moreover, repeatedly proposed increasing its own powers of oversight of member state 'competitiveness' (EPSC, 2015) -conceived problematically in terms of 'structural reform' and labour market flexibility -in ways that critics have rightly asserted would lead to the significant further erosion of social rights (Oberndorfer, 2015: 199) . Certainly such executive power is problematic in terms of its little regard for a separation of competences or institutional balance either within the EU or at national level; the democratic and social deficits that have long plagued the EU (Bellamy, 2012) are compounded by governance mechanisms that directly undermine these sources of legitimacy.
That said, such de-politicisation unsurprisingly prompted at least some re-politicisation. This came from below in the form of public protest and dissent (Bailey et al., 2016) and in the form of clear rifts between member states and between the EU and other international organisations and sources of economic knowledge such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The
Commission was not immune from this; in practice it did not strictly or consistently enforce its own rules, using its discretion to interpret data and define terms in ways that eased the pressure on, for instance, France, Italy and Spain (Mabbett and Schelkle 2014; Schmidt, 2016 Schmidt, : 1044 .
Despite dissenting voices (Spiegel 2014) , ultimately even a fiscally hawkish Germany acquiesced to some extent in this greater flexibility. Moreover, under President Jean-Claude Juncker the Commission's rhetoric shifted: its reflection piece on 'The Future of Europe (at 27)'
(Commission, 2017a) emphasised the importance of the 'social dimension' (Commission, 2017b) and it was concurrently working towards 'Establishing a European Pillar of Social Rights'
(Commission, 2017c). v As discussed in the following section, such re-politicisation certainly had not marked a radical departure from a broader neoliberal agenda at the time of writing (mid-2017). However, this (political) flexibility within the Commission (Schmidt, 2016) does at least speak to the possibility of more substantive change.
The unfulfilled promise of social rights
Economic integration has, since at least the 1980s, indirectly eroded social settlements and rights at the domestic level through its encroachment on domestic economic policy making autonomy and, with EMU, budgetary policies (Höpner and Schäfer, 2012; Scharpf, 2010; Streeck, 2014) . To the extent that the EU has developed a discourse on the 'social', this has recast it in a manner that is compatible with the contemporary competitiveness agenda established in the context of the 2000 Lisbon Strategy. This amounts to a supply-side orientation, which promotes various kinds of investment in 'human capital' and rejects statutory labour market regulation as an impediment to efficiency, instead championing flexible labour markets (Schellinger, 2015: 5) .
Post-crisis reforms of the sort described in the preceding section have, on the one hand, led to more significant indirect encroachment by the EU through the introduction of tougher macroeconomic rules (especially on public debt) and, on the other hand, led to an expansion of the EU's ability to directly impose its particular vision of the 'social' in domestic reform processes.
It is against this backdrop that we ought to understand the incorporation of a number of ostensibly social policies into the Semester process outlined in the preceding section. Thus, while there has been an increase in social goals in country specific recommendations (CSRs), particularly since 2013 (Zeitlin and Vanhercke, 2014: 33-33) we should be circumspect about regarding this as the 'socialisation' of the semester (Clauwaert, 2016: 16) . Indeed, it is important to consider both the content of those recommendations and the enforcement mechanisms that apply to them. On the one hand, where hard mechanisms are applied (for instance in line with the MIP), the content tends to align with the supply-side agenda described above. In particular, recommendations are geared towards greater labour market flexibility -focusing on, for instance, employment protection and collective bargaining frameworks -and substantive state spending -focusing on, for instance, pensions and healthcare (European Commission, 2013: 17-19; Pavolini et al, 2015: 65-68; Bekker, 2015: 12-13; Clauwaert, 2016: 12) . According to one official in the more socially orientated DG Employment, every proposal they make in the European Semester must be conducive to macroeconomic competitiveness (interview, official in DG Employment, Brussels, 17 th June 2015).
On the other hand, where soft mechanisms apply to recommendations -in accordance with, for instance, the Europe 2020 programme -they have included at least some that are not clearly linked to a broader competitiveness or economic agenda (de la Porte and Heins, 2015) .
However, to the limited extent that recommendations support them, it is doubtful that substantive social standards -for instance, on pension provision and healthcare -can easily be maintained while the more robustly enforced SGP targets (on debt and deficit reduction) are also met. Indeed, many scholars have highlighted the negative impact of fiscal targets on social spending (Hyman, 2015: 98; Pavolini et al. 2015; Grahl, 2015) . A recent attempt by the Commission to integrate social standards into the European Semester through a 'social scoreboard' was met with a similar critique by trade unions: in short, the standards lacked the 'teeth' to challenge the direction of travel in macroeconomic policy (ETUC, 2014; Zeitlin and Vanhercke, 2014: 53; Commission, 2017d) . Indeed, when we consider socio-economic governance as a whole it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, rhetoric notwithstanding, a 'constitutional asymmetry' (Scharpf, 2010) between enforceable economic and unenforceable substantive social policies has become starker in the recent crisis context (Hyman, 2015: 98; de la Porte and Heins, 2015) .
That said, the 'European constitution' or acquis is far from unambiguously neo-liberal. The so- -actively monitor these rights in the context of the European Semester. Indeed, the Commission's Strategy on the Charter (2010) outlines various mechanisms that were intended to ensure that rights were given due regard in all the political activities of the Commission: in other words, to ensure that they were 'mainstreamed' (see also, Maduro, 2003: 285) . It commits the EU to being 'exemplary' in the field of rights and outlines a range of governance mechanisms geared towards this end, including: rights impact assessments, preparatory consultations with relevant stakeholders, processes for inter-institutional dialogue, and explanatory memorandums to detail how rights issues are affected (European Commission, 2010: 4-8) . In short, these governance mechanisms are designed to ensure that fundamental rights are given due regard and that any interference with rights is legitimate and justified both ex ante and post hoc.
These rights mechanisms have, to date, not been deployed to any great extent, including in the context of the Semester (see Pye, 2017) . At a technical level, there are two main reasons for this.
First, the Commission's strategy on the Charter is primarily based around the traditional
Community method vi of policy-making, whereas, as noted, economic governance deploys a complex hybrid of co-ordination mechanisms and legal rules (Armstrong, 2013) . Second, it is notable that social rights are poorly developed in the case-law of the ECJ. This is relevant because although the rights mechanisms highlighted above are not judicial, it is primarily the jurisprudence of the ECJ that shapes how the Commission engages with rights (interview, official in DG Justice, 2 nd July 2015). The reason for this lies in the origins of rights in the EU.
Prior to the drafting of the Charter in 2000, rights were introduced into the EU legal order on a case-by-case basis by the ECJ. As courts have generally been wary of adjudicating on social rights, preferring instead to leave such questions to elected bodies, the ECJ has, until very recently, shied away from introducing social rights into the EU's legal order. Even in recent caselaw, social rights remain poorly developed, particularly when faced with the economic freedoms that have underpinned European integration in the single market (see Pye, 2017; Höpner and Schäfer 2012; De Vries, 2013) .
The Commission has expressed a wish to address these shortcomings on social rights. In its aforementioned communication on the 'social pillar' it, inter alia, focuses on 'the enforcement of the rich acquis already existing' (2017c: 7). Given its margin for discretionary action in the context of the Semester, the Commission could certainly use the ECFR to develop a more appropriate set of standards on social rights in the context of its socio-economic governance.
And it could do so by turning to another source of standards on these rights: a source that has been increasingly critical of the post-crisis erosion of such rights in Europe.
Social rights in the European semester
The Commission's desire to be 'exemplary' on rights (European Commission, 2010: 3) consists,
as noted above, in giving weight to rights throughout its governance processes. Member states are required to do the same in the context of implementing EU law. The Commission has, as we have emphasised, been far from exemplary in this respect in the context of its recent socioeconomic governance and member states have failed to sufficiently draw attention to rights issues arising from Commission recommendations. Injecting a concern with social rights into all steps in the European Semester process would offer a means of partially redressing the constitutional asymmetry between economic and social issues that has widened in the crisis context. Given its preeminent role in this process, it is particularly important that the Commission addresses its shortcomings in this area and takes these rights seriously. To think that social issues could immediately be prioritised is, of course, unrealistic, as it would necessarily mean a blanket prohibition on a range of current (economic) policies. However, in the absence of either deepening political union or the disintegration of EMU, the type of technocratic intervention offered by social rights holds the potential to address the immediate shortcomings of socio-economic governance, namely, as highlighted in the previous section, the re-orientation of certain social and labour policies towards economic objectives and the 'soft' basis of more [ Table 1 to be inserted here]
How might these standards influence socio-economic governance? As highlighted in the previous section, several social and labour policy areas have been re-orientated towards economic objectives. These standards can be used to draw these policies back towards their social purpose by embedding clear rights-based standards. For example, the decentralisation of collective bargaining and liberalisation of labour markets have been used as a (in our view misguided) means to achieve macroeconomic competitiveness. This has run counter to the standards established by the ECSR. In more extreme cases, such as in Spain, the pursuit of these objectives has actually breached the minimum standards. This has been the case for the forced decentralisation of collective bargaining, allowing unilateral employer derogation from collective agreements, inadequate notice periods for employment protection, lengthy probationary periods, and a low minimum wage (ECSR, 2014b) . These reforms to collective bargaining and labour market regulations were requested through Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs) (Council of the EU, 2011) and (as noted above) directly by the ECB. More generally, as the policy direction at the EU level has pursued flexibility in labour markets and reduced spending in social security, there is a real risk that minimum standards will be breached. To prevent this from happening, adequate checks on the policy recommendations, particularly those linked to enforcement mechanisms, could be incorporated into the European Semester and the socially destructive impact of these policies could be identified at the European level and prevented.
Whilst the minimum standards outlined above would help to mitigate the more excessive policies being utilised in the Eurozone, the principle of progressive realisation has the potential to develop a stronger social dimension. It is clear that the drive towards flexible labour markets, decentralised collective bargaining, and austerity have interfered with numerous social rights, including many of those highlighted in table one. For example, decentralising collective bargaining is not compatible with ensuring consultation at the 'regional/sectoral' level; increasing flexibility in labour markets often undermines efforts to protect workers against unfair dismissal and ensure reasonable notice periods; and retrenchment in social security runs counter to the commitment to progressively raise the system of social security to a higher level and may even threaten the existence of a functioning social security system (see table one, above). Indeed, several studies by human rights actors have highlighted interferences with social rights in the responses to the Eurozone crisis (Commissioner for Human Rights, 2013; Jimena Quesada, 2014).
As noted above, under the principle of progressive realisation such interference would require justification with respect to its proportionality and legitimacy. In the context of the Semester, justification of rights interference would have to accompany any CSR or recommendation under the enforcement procedures (EDP and MIP) that seek to interfere with or lower the standards of social rights, in a fashion similar to the aforementioned explanatory memorandums the Commission utilises alongside traditional legislative proposals. Here much would depend on the economic ideology adopted. From the neoliberal status quo position enunciated above -and supported by the institutions -the defence of rights infringements would likely rest on the argument that 'internal devaluation' and consolidation promotes macroeconomic competitiveness, fiscal sustainability and therefore growth. However, such ideas are certainly contestable, if not disproven (among many others, Krugman, 2015; Stiglitz, 2014; Ryner and Cafruny, 2017; Wigger, 2015) . A deliberative engagement with social rights would, of course, not in itself lead to the dominance of less neoliberal (for instance, neo-Keynesian) alternatives, but it would at least stimulate much needed debate within institutions that have long treated consolidation as 'common sense'.
Respect for social rights would also require and facilitate changes to the structures of governance. Two changes in particular would be required. First, a means to determine the impact of proposed policies on rights standards. As mentioned above, the rights standards in table one are only a representation of select rights. The full case-law of the ECSR is significantly larger. For these standards to be properly integrated into the Semester, it would need to be underpinned by some degree of background analysis of the potential impact of proposed policies that incorporate the standards established by the ECSR. Currently, the Commission, in conjunction with member states, engages in a significant amount of detailed socio-economic analyses of the situation in each member state. This is found in the Country Report that accompanies every member state's CSR and the In-Depth Reviews that are conducted for those member states experiencing severe imbalances. It should also be noted that the Commission already has ample experience conducting impact assessments on various issues, now including fundamental rights bolster the attention given to rights assessments, particularly given the rights-based strategies utilised by trade unions across the EU in opposition to austerity (Kilpatrick and De Witte, 2014) .
Conclusion
The argument put forth in this paper is motivated by Fritz Scharpf's (2014: 22) assertion that, 'it may be worth our time to shift some attention from the study of what is going wrong… to
controlled speculation about what might be put right if the window of political feasibility should ever open.' As noted in introduction, a rather large 'window of political opportunity' will be required to enable any radical divergence from the current trajectory given blockages to further integration and disintegration. The proposal we offer in this paper, however, would require a much narrower opening: it might be implemented without legal change, 'by stealth' (Schmidt, 2016) ; it is pragmatic, but (unlike similarly pragmatic interventions) not reliant on 'soft-law' or too deferential to the (neoliberal) status quo; it is purposefully built upon immanent but largely untapped EU constitutional realities (particularly the Charter); and its implementation would draw upon pre-existing expertise (in the ECSR). Moreover, it is realisable within current EU socio-economic governance arrangements and could be implemented by an actor -the Commission -that has been empowered as potential 'policy entrepreneur' (Crespy and Menz, 2015) and has expressed a rhetorical commitment to a social Europe (Commission, 2016 (Commission, , 2017c ).
We are not naïve, however, about the implementation difficulties of our proposal, which would rely on shifts in the thinking of key (dominant economic) actors in the Commission. Moreover, although its strength lies in the fact that it might be enacted without member state convergence, in practice it may well require at least the tacit support of a coalition of key member-states for a more pro-social agenda. At the time of writing (mid 2017), the imminent withdrawal of social Europe's most important and longstanding adversary -namely, the United Kingdom -offered some hope for that agenda (Lindstrom, 2017) . However, the position of the new French President, Emmanuel Macron, remained largely unknown, as was the outcome of the 2017
German federal elections. Whatever that outcome, Germany's strict adherence to a neoliberal (or ordoliberal) orthodoxy -underpinned by a desire to maintain its current account surpluses and competitive advantage (Ryner and Cafruny, 2017 : 222-7) -was likely to remain a crucial sticking point.
Furthermore, even if implemented our proposal would constitute but a first step in addressing the EU's constitutional asymmetry. Indeed, to focus on the Commission as the central executive actor in socio-economic governance (as we have done in this paper for pragmatic purposes) is not to endorse or seek to constitute this reality. Our proposal would lead not only to more social 'outputs', but also pluralise decision-making within socio-economic governance beyond the Commission -particularly through the aforementioned processes of public justification linked to 'progressive realisation' -increasing both its deliberative or 'throughput' (Schmidt, 2010) and 'input' legitimacy. In the short term, taking social rights seriously would permit an opening of the Semester process to the Council of Europe and its substantive standards on social rights.
However, in the longer term such modest reform would, we would hope, lead to a more radical repoliticisation; paraphrasing Scharpf (2014: 18) , an enlargement of the space of national and European politics. In short, the rebalancing or re-politicisation of the Commission's socioeconomic governance might be regarded as a small but potentially important first step in plotting our way from where we are to a more radical social-democratic constitutional settlement for the EU.
Commission (  Cover significant percentage of population for traditional risks  Payments no lower than 50% of national median wage. Payments between 40% and 50% permissible if combined with other social assistance to reach 50% national median wage.  Welfare payments for reasonable durations  Reasonable period allowing for recipients to refuse employment without losing benefits  Restrictions to social security system allowed to  Ensure existence of functioning social security system established by law and funded collectively  Commitment to progressively raise system of social security to higher level extent that effective protection for all members of society retained and does not reduce system to one of minimum assistance Source: own elaboration based on case-law digest and specific county conclusions of the ECSR (ECSR, 2008; ECSR, 2014a; ECSR, 2014b) i The authors would like to thank the following for discussion and engagement on the ideas contained herein: colleagues at the Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute (SPERI), particularly Tony Payne, Colin Hay and Scott Lavery; David Gow at Social Europe Journal; participants at the Euromemo Group 2015 meeting in Roskilde, Denmark, particularly John Grahl; Simon Bulmer; and Amandine Crespy. The usual disclaimer applies. Robbie Pye would like to thank the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and Owen Parker the UK Leverhulme Trust for supporting their work in this area.
ii The term neoliberal is used throughout this paper, though some would be inclined to describe the EU's economic governance as 'ordo'-liberal (following the German 'Freiburg school'). The similarities, differences and overlaps have prompted debate in recent political economy literature on the EU. Suffice to say here that ordoliberalism can be understood as a particular kind of neoliberalism with an emphasis on the need for rules to govern markets. iii This structure applies to all states that are not being governed through so-called Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs). MoUs apply to states in receipt of financial support. The 'troika' of EU, International Monetary Fund and European Central Bank oversee relations with MoU states. Such governance is stricter and (even) more intrusive than within the semester. It has been compared, for instance, with the implementation of IMF Structural Adjustment Programmes in the developing world. iv In addition to these formal surveillance and enforcement procedures, additional pressure can be placed on Eurozone states through mechanisms such as the ECB's bond purchasing programme. This was initially done in clandestine fashion and only came to light when two letters sent by the ECB to the governments of Spain and Italy calling for specific policy reforms were leaked to the media (Sacchi, 2015) .
v The communication on the pillar of social rights was published following a consultation throughout the second half of 2016 (Commission, 2017c: 4) . The pillar -a largely aspirational agenda -is conceived primarily for the Eurozone though other countries are invited to participate in its development.
vi
With the Lisbon treaty, formally renamed as the 'Union method'. vii One of the authors of this paper was involved in developing such links when working for DG Enlargement 2003 -2006 . Such links were geared towards establishing more detailed criteria that would offer greater substance and detail to the broader Copenhagen political criteria, particularly pertaining to human rights and minority rights. Similar use could be made of the expertise in the Council of Europe to develop more substantive understandings of social rights.
